Abstract-Authentication and key agreement scheme is an important mechanism for legal users to access the services of wireless sensor network. However, the design of authentication and key agreement schemes in WSNs is still quite a challenging problem. In this paper, we analyze an untraceable temporalcredential-based two-factor authentication scheme using ECC for WSNs proposed by Jiang et al. in 2016, and point out the scheme can not resist malicious user impersonation attack, sensor node capture attack and suffer from forward security problem, low efficiency problem, no password change phase problem and time synchronization problem.
INTRODUCTION Nowadays, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are the first choices for a wide range of real-time monitoring applications, such as health care, environmental monitoring, traffic monitoring, etc. In WSNs, data collected by sensor nodes sometimes contain valuable and confidential information that only authorized users are allowed to access. As yet, the design of user authentication and key agreement scheme for resource deficient wirless sensor networks has been substantially addressed by various researchers.
In 2009, Das [1] first proposed a two-factor authentication scheme for wieless sensor networks using smart card, which leads user authentication for WSNs to a new direction. In this direction, a dozen of authentication schemes have been presented to eliminate the security weaknesses of the earlier ones [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Das claimed his scheme to be free from the security problems such as stolenverifier, many logged-in-users with the same identity, guessing, impersonation and replay attacks. In 2010, He et al. [2] pointed out that Das's scheme does not resist impersonation attack, privileged insider attack and lack of password update mechanism. During the same time, Khan and Alghathbar [3] showed that Das's scheme susceptible to gateway node bypassing attack and privileged insider attack and proposed an improved scheme. In 2013, Xue et al. [8] proposed an authentication scheme based on the concept of temporal credential for wireless sensor networks. They claimed that their scheme provides identity and password protection, and is immune to stolen smart card attack. Unfortunately, this scheme was pointed out that it is susceptible to many kinds of attacks such as offline password guessing attack, sensor node impersonation attack et al. by He et al. [9] . Based on these, He et al. improved Xue et al.'s scheme. However, Jiang et al. [10] revealed that He et al.'s scheme is susceptible to stolen smart card attack and prone to tracking attack, and proposed an improved scheme in 2016.
In this paper, we will show that Jiang et al.'s scheme [10] is also not secure and vulnerable to malicious user impersonation attack and node capture attack and suffer from forward security problem, low efficiency problem, no password change phase problem and time synchronization problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we briefly review Jiang et al.'s scheme. Section 3 points out the weaknesses of Jiang et al.'s scheme. Finally, we draw our conclusion in section 4.
The notations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 1 . [10] . Their scheme includes three phases: registration phase, login phase and authentication phase; and involves three entities: users, gate-way node (GW) and sensor nodes.
A. Registration Phase
In this phase, GWN selects the additive group G generated by a point P with a large prime order n on an ellipic curve E . Then GWN randomly generates a number x as its private key and compoutes y xP  as the public key. Finally, GWN stores x and publishes the system parameters { , , , } E G P y .
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III. WEAKNESSES OF JIANG ET AL.'S SCHEME
In this section, we will show that Jiang et al.'s scheme [10] is vulnerable to malicious user impersonation attack and node capture attack and suffer from forward security problem, low efficiency problem, no password change phase problem and time synchronization problem.
A. Forward security problem
Forward security problem means that once attacker obtains the master key stored by GWN in some way, he/she will restore some previous session keys using the known master key and the information intercepted or eavesdropped from the public communicational channel. In this way, the attacker can easily decrypt the data transmitted in previous sessions.
In Jiang U 's succeeding login requests will be denied.
F. Time synchronization problem
Since time stamp was adopted in the login and authentication phase of Jiang et al.'s scheme, it is inevitable that there is a probability of time synchronization problem between user and gateway node. Also same problem can be occurred between gateway node and sensor nodes during communication.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyze an untraceable temporalcredential-based two-factor authentication scheme using ECC for WSNs proposed by Jiang et al. in 2016, and point out the scheme can not resist malicious user impersonation attack, sensor node capture attack and suffer from forward security problem, low efficiency problem, no password change phase problem and time synchronization problem.
